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‘In a transnational world… feminists need detailed, historicized maps of the circuits 
of power’1 
 
‘…we should begin to dream about and plan for a different world. A fairer world. A 
world of happier men and happier women…’2 
  
‘Populism is not only incompatible with feminizing politics – it actually reinforces 
                                                     
1 Caren Kaplan, ‘The Politics of Location as Transnational Feminist Critical Practice’ in Caren 
Kaplan and Inderpal Grewal (eds.), Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational 
Feminist Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 148 
2 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, We Should All Be Feminists (New York: Anchor Books, 2014), p. 
25. 
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patriarchy. We need to transform the way left-wing politics is done’.3 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to offer a feminist critique of populism, not as a distinct 
mode of politics, 4 but as an analytical and political concept.  In other words, I want to re-
direct our attention away from populism, understood as a politics ‘out there’, towards the 
academic theoretical debates that have given this analytical term a new lease on life and 
propelled it beyond academic circles into the wider public discourse.5 More concretely, my 
aims are two-fold. First, I seek to critically interrogate how populism has been 
conceptualised in the literature. What ontological assumptions sustain this particular 
understanding of politics, especially with respect to its notions of power, subjectivity and 
collective agency? And what would a feminist engagement with these narratives look like?  
Second, I want to explore the performative effects of this term on our contemporary 
political discourse and political imagination. What work does this notion do with respect to 
how we evaluate different forms of radical or ‘insurgent’ politics and what are the 
consequences of this for feminism?   
 
In response to these questions, I develop two broad arguments. In Part One, I identify 
the two prevailing conceptions of populism that dominate the field and then go on to offer a 
feminist critique of each narrative. More concretely, I argue that longstanding feminist 
insights into the workings of power, subjectivity and collective agency - insights completely 
neglected in this literature - pose important challenges to prevailing academic theorisations 
of populism. In Part Two, I explore populism’s role as a political signifier and trace how it is 
                                                     
3 Laura Roth and Kate Shea Baird, ‘Left-wing populism and the Feminization of Politics’, 
ROAR Magazine available at https://roarmag.org/essays/left-populism-feminization-
politics/ accessed 07/06 2019. 
4 There is a small but growing feminist literature exploring the relationship between gender 
and various instantiations of so called populist politics. See Cherry Miller, ‘Feminist Politics 
and Populism: Positioning Gender in Populism Studies’, Alusta available at: 
https://alusta.uta.fi/2019/01/21/feminist-politics-and-populism-positioning-gender-in-
populism-studies/; Nancy Fraser, ‘Progressive Neoliberalism versus Reactionary Populism: A 
Choice that Feminists Should Refuse’, Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 24:4 
(2016), pp. 281-284; Akwugo Emejulu, ‘Can the people be feminists? Analysing the fate of 
feminist justice claims in populist grassroots movements in the United States’, Interface: a 
Journal for and about Social Movements, 3:2 (2011), pp. 123-151; Paloma Caravantes, ‘New 
versus Old Politics in Podemos: Feminization and Masculinized Party Discourse’, Men and 
Masculinities (2018) available at 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1097184X18769350; Johanna Kantola and 
Emanuela Lombardo, ‘Populism and Feminist Politics: The Cases of Finland and Spain’, 
European Journal of Political Research, (2019) available at 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-6765.12333. 
5 For a helpful summary and overview of how populism is framed in the mainstream media, 
see Tim Bale, Stijn van Kessel and Paul Taggart, 'Thrown Around With Abandon? Popular 
Understandings of Populism as Conveyed by the Print Media: A UK Case Study', Acta 
Politica, 46:2 (2011), pp. 111-31. 
3 
 
being used, by whom and to what effect. Here I claim that our current deployment of the 
term to describe most forms of oppositional or radical politics today does not bode well for 
feminists politically. This is because the ascendancy of populism as the trope du jour has 
been accompanied by an unacknowledged politicisation of academic scholarship which 
encourages brash judgements and indignant outrage at any and all challenges to the centre 
ground of politics. In so doing, it narrows the landscape on which feminism can operate and 
thrive. I conclude that it is as a signifier, rather than as an analytical concept, that it does its 
most powerful work and that, as a result, feminists need to resist the ‘populist hype’.6  
 
Before moving on to Part One, it is important to specify the tradition of feminism that 
I am speaking to and from in this article. By feminism, I am referring to a social movement 
that embodies a ‘shared principled commitment to challenging gender hierarchies’7 and that 
promises emancipation for all, as Adichie’s evocative appeal, above, suggests.8 So while I 
acknowledge that feminism embodies an internally contested, multi-perspective movement, 
here I am interested in drawing particularly on those scholars who have self-consciously 
sought to steer it towards a transformative, radical politics, i.e., one that seeks to overturn 
systemic power relations of inequality and oppression.9 This includes a range of diverse 
feminist theorists within the critical theory and socialist tradition as well as all those seeking 
to explore the challenges and possibilities of building and theorising an intersectional, anti-
racist, queer feminism. To this extent, I sample from multiple feminisms in order to make 
my case. 
 
Understood in this way, the feminist project seeks to undertake at least three political 
tasks, each of which require theoretical and empirical work. The first is the recognition and 
analysis of injustice, and, to this end, as Kaplan points out, the production of detailed maps 
of the complex workings of power. While feminists do sometimes name and shame specific 
individuals or groups for their actions, their main goal is to identify and conceptualise the 
operations of structural relations of subordination which include, but can go beyond 
‘patriarchy’, ‘racism’, and ‘heteronormativity’.10 Moreover, these generalised patterns of 
                                                     
6 The notion of ‘populist hype’ is borrowed from Jason Glynos and Aurélien Mondon, ‘The 
Political Logic of the Populist Hype: The Case of right-wing populism’s “meteoric rise” and its 
relations to the status quo’, Populismus Working Paper 4, (2016) available at 
https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/148981154/WP4_glynos_mondon_final_
upload.pdf. 
7 Valerie Sperling, Myra Marx Ferree and Barbara Risman, ‘Constructing Global Feminism: 
Transnational Advocacy Networks and Russian Women’s Activism’, Signs: Journal of Women 
in Culture and Society, 26:4 (2001), pp. 1115-1186. 
8 Although feminism has traditionally been associated with the liberation of women, 
increasingly its conception of social justice also speaks to class and racial inequalities as well 
as to gender stereotypes that constrain men. In this sense feminism can be understood as 
an emancipatory project ‘for everyone’. See bell hooks, Feminism is for Everybody: 
Passionate Politics (New York: South End Press, 2000). 
9 For a discussion of the different meanings of ‘radical’ and its relevance to feminism see 
Eschle and Maiguashca, ‘Reclaiming Feminist Futures: Co-opted and Progressive Politics in a 
Neoliberal Age’, Political Studies, 62: 3 (2014), pp. 634-651, 12-13. 
10 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), Ch. 2. 
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conscious and unconscious collective behavior are usually understood as overlapping, thus 
demanding close attention to the ways in which, as political subjects, we are caught in 
multiple, intersecting systems of oppression.11 Learning again from Nigerian feminist 
Adichie, a second vital task for feminism is that of envisioning, theorising and putting into 
practice a more just alternative future. To this end, feminists have directed their energies to 
developing a range of utopian visions and a distinct approach to ethics.12 In this way, 
feminist scholarship is unapologetically politicised and normative in orientation and, as 
such, sees itself as waging a struggle both against injustice and for a transformed world 
order. Finally, given this commitment to transformative individual and collective agency, 
feminism has had to grapple with the thorny issue of subjectivity and how to conceptualise 
it as a site of power and agency. Despite the ongoing disagreements between so called 
‘essentialists’ and ‘constructivists’, feminists have persisted in their efforts to develop 
generative, creative and hermeneutical conceptions of subjectivity which foreground the 
influence of a number of forces -  from our unconscious selves to our emotions to our 
everyday experiences – and which enable us to see the possibility of resistance.13  
 
I suggest that these three features, taken together, render the feminist project a 
crucial and vital instantiation of both left politics and critical theorising. This intuition draws 
on the ideas of Norberto Bobbio and Steven Lukes who argue that all left political projects 
strive to uphold the ‘emotive value of equality’14 by struggling against and seeking to rectify 
‘unjustifiable but remedial inequalities’.15 In this context, Lukes specifically identifies 
feminism as a case in point. It also takes inspiration from the work of Stephen Leonard who 
argues that feminism must be understood as one instance of ‘critical theory in political 
                                                     
11 Kimberley Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’, The 
University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1:8 (1989); Patricia Hill Collins, ‘It’s all in the Family: 
Intersections of Gender, Race and Nation’, Hypatia, 13:3 (1998), pp. 62–82; Nira Yuval-Davis, 
‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13:3 (2006), 
pp. 193–209. 
12 See, for example, Erin McKenna, The Task of Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist 
Perspective (New York: Roman and Littlefield, 2001); Kimberley Hutchings, ‘Towards a 
Feminist International Ethics’, Review of International Studies, 26:5 (2000), pp. 111-130 and 
Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
13 See Diana Fuss, ‘The “Risk” of Essence’ in Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (eds.), 
Feminisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 250-51; Susan Heckman, 
‘Reconstituting the Subject’, Hypatia, 6: 2 (1991), pp. 44-63; Lois McNay, Gender and 
Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist Theory and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000).  
14 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996), p. 67. 
15 Steven Lukes, ‘Epilogue: The Grand Dichotomy of the Twentieth Century’, in Terrence Ball 
and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 602-626. 
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practice’.16 It is as a critical theory that feminism has produced a prodigious body of 
scholarship over the years which aims to make sense of and hold to account not only its 
own movement, but that of other social movements also rallying against perceived 
injustices in the name of a fairer world. To this extent, feminism offers us a vast repertoire 
of concepts, insights and arguments about the ‘why’, ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ of radical 
politics. As we shall see below, the neglect of this rich, multivalent theoretical tradition 
serves to impoverish current efforts to understand and conceptualise the nature and origins 
of populism.   
 
 
Mapping Populism as a Concept and its Feminist Discontents 
 
The study of populism today is being undertaken, almost exclusively, by two groups of 
scholars: political scientists, particularly comparativists, and political theorists. 17 IR scholars 
have shown less enthusiasm to enter the fray, although there are signs that this might be 
changing. A plethora of articles have been published in recent years on regional populisms,18 
especially in the context of Latin America,19 and there is a growing interest in exploring the 
impact of right-wing movements, often conflated with populism, and their impact on 
foreign policy20 and the international liberal order more broadly.21 In addition, the notion of 
‘transnational populism’ is gaining some attention, although this has been mainly pursued 
                                                     
16 Stephen Leonard, Critical Theory in Political Practice (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990). For a feminist defence of the claim that feminism, as a political project, speaks 
to and from a left politics and, as such, embodies a form of critical theorising, see Catherine 
Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, ‘Rethinking Globalised Resistance: Feminist Activism and 
Critical Theorising in IR’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9: 2 (2007), 
pp. 284-301 and Eschle and Maiguashca, ‘Reclaiming Feminist Futures’.  
17 See Paul K. Jones, ‘Insights from the Infamous: Recovering the Social-Theoretical First 
Phase of Populism Studies’, European Journal of Social Theory, (2018) available at 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1368431018772507. Most of the Special 
Issues on populism, thus far, have been in the field of Political Science [eg. International 
Political Science Review, 38:4 (2017) or Comparative Political Studies, 51: 13 (2018)] or in 
Political Theory [e.g. Constellations, 21: 4 (2014)]. 
18 See, for example, Shabnam Holliday, ‘Populism, the International and Methodological 
Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran-Israel Nexus’, Political Studies available at 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032321718817476 and Vedi Hadiz and 
Angelos Chryssogelos, ‘Populism in World Politics: A Comparative Cross Regional 
Perspective’, International Political Science Review, 38: 4 (2017), pp. 399-411. 
19 For a Latin American focus see Robert Muggah and Brian Winter, ‘Is Populism Making a 
Comeback in Latin America?’, Foreign Policy (Oct 23rd, 2017); Shannon O’Neil, ‘Latin 
America’s Populist Hangover’, Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2016). 
20 Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, ‘The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on 
Foreign Policy’, European Political Science Review, 7: 4 (2015), pp. 525-546. 
21 John Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International Order?’, International Affairs, 94: 1 
(2018), pp. 7–23. 
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by non-IR scholars and remains under studied.22 Although not yet observable in IR 
discourse, there has been a meteoric rise in the use of the term populism as a blanket 
descriptor for radical or ‘insurgent’ politics of all persuasions. This trend has become 
particularly pronounced since the 2008 financial crisis,23 and marks not only contemporary 
academic scholarship24, but also all forms of media coverage of the current state of 
politics.25 In this context, it is unsurprising that Cambridge University Press deemed 
‘populism’ to be word of the year in 2017, stating that it is a phenomenon that is both ‘truly 
local and truly global’.26 
 
In this part of the article I critically interrogate, from a feminist theoretical 
perspective, the two prevailing definitions of populism shaping our understanding of this 
putative phenomenon. In so doing, I aim to make the case that, whichever definition one 
chooses to draw on, these two incompatible, yet intertwined narratives, are both marred by 
anaemic conceptions of power, collective agency, and subjectivity. As such, neither story is 
able to present us with a convincing account of why this form of radical politics emerges in 
the first place, who its protagonists are, and how they come together in collective struggle.  
                                                     
22 For one effort to distinguish between ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ populism see 
Benjamin Moffitt, ‘Transnational Populism?: Representative Claims, Media and the difficulty 
of constructing a Transnational People’, Journal of the European Institute for 
Communication and Culture, 24: 4 (2017), pp. 409-425. See also Frank Stengel, David 
MacDonald and Dirk Nabers (eds.), Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter and 
Transnational Dimensions (London: Palgrave, 2019). 
23 Cas Mudde, ‘How populism became the concept that defines our age’, Guardian (Nov. 
22nd 2018) available at https://wrdtp.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Mudde-How-
populism-became-the-concept-that-defines-our-age-_-Cas-Mudde-_-World-news-_-The-
Guardian.pdf accessed July 11th, 2019. 
24 For a critical discussion of the way that ‘populism’ is now being adopted ‘willy-nilly’, as 
Frank puts it, in academic analyses to explain all contemporary challenges to liberal 
democracy see Jason Frank, ‘Populism is not the Problem’, Boston Review: A Political and 
Literary Forum (Aug. 15th 2018)  available at https://bostonreview.net/politics/jason-frank-
populism-not-the-problem accessed  July 7th, 2019 and Philippe Marlière, ‘The Demophobes 
and the Great Fear of Populism’, Open Democracy (June 4th 2013) at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/demophobes-and-great-fear-of-
populism/ accessed July 7th, 2019.  
25 The Guardian Newspaper, for instance, has given the concept unprecedented attention 
initiating ‘The New Populism’ series in 2018 which combines academic articles by key 
thinkers on the subject (Cas Mudde is now a regular contributor to the paper) with simple 
quizzes that readers can take to find out if they too are populists! See, for instance, Peter 
Baker, ‘We the People: the Battle to Define Populism’, Guardian (Jan 10th 2019) available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-
populism?CMP=share_btn_link accessed July 11th 2019 and Matthijs Rooduijn, ‘Why is 
Populism Suddenly all the Rage?’, Guardian (Nov. 20th 2018) at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/political-science/2018/nov/20/why-is-populism-
suddenly-so-sexy-the-reasons-are-many. 
26 https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-
cambridge-university-press 
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Two Tales of Populism 
 
It is the work of Cas Mudde which – often alongside his co-author Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser – constitutes the most widely cited body of texts on contemporary populism 
within political science with a long list of scholars from different scholarly backgrounds 
following his lead.27 For Mudde, and others belonging to what I shall dub the ‘ideational 
camp’, populism must be understood as a ‘thin ideology’. His oft-quoted definition reads as 
follows:  
 
populism is best defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression 
of the volonté general (general will) of the people.28 
 
In these terms, populism must be understood as a ‘mental map’, accompanied by particular 
discourses, through which people come to understand the world and articulate their 
grievances and aspirations.29 The specific content of this ideology stems from a political 
determination and moral judgment that the well-being of ‘the people’ is being trammeled 
by the special interests of a ‘corrupt elite’. To this extent, it embodies a binary politics of 
confrontation, one in which a singular ‘us’ faces down a ‘them’. In this context, the key 
protagonists in this story of righteous rebellion, and upon which the construction of the ‘us’ 
depends, are a malleable, but angry group of people, waiting to be lead, and an 
enterprising, charismatic leader willing to take on the job.  
 
While theorising the conditions that give rise to this radical politics has not been the 
focus of this body of literature, much of the commentary takes for granted several key 
factors including the entrenchment of neoliberalism and the economic disenfranchisement 
of vast swathes of people; the tyranny of political consensus and the pull of ‘centrism’ which 
                                                     
27 See, for example, Takis Pappas and Hans Kriesi, ‘Populism in Europe During Crisis: An 
Introduction’, in Pappas and Kriesi (eds.), European Populism in the Shadow of the Great 
Recession (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015); Luke March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to 
Vox Populi: Left-wing Populism as a “Shadow” of Contemporary Socialism', SAIS Review, 27: 
1 (2007), pp. 63-67; Stijn van Kessel, Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); and Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016). In the case of the latter, Mudde’s definition is 
expanded to include ‘political style’. Notwithstanding this interesting effort to finesse the 
notion of populism, Moffitt’s account assumes that populism functions as an ideology in the 
first instance and then subsequently, as a performance. 
28Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', Government and Opposition, 39: 4 (2005), pp. 541-63, 
p. 543. 
29 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’ in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower 
Sargent and Marc Stears (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p. 7. 
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has stifled political debate along with all voices of dissent30; and, perhaps most prominently, 
the changing political preferences/concerns of citizens which includes the increased salience 
of cultural identity in an era of material security.31 Taken together, these processes have 
produced fertile ground for an ‘uncompromising’ politics which, once in power, has the 
potential to morph into a politics of illiberalism. As Mudde explains,  
 
The main bad is that populism is a monist and moralist ideology, which denies the 
existence of divisions of interests and opinions within “the people” and rejects the 
legitimacy of political opponents.32 
 
Although Cas Mudde has been the dominant influence on the study of populism, the 
work of the late Ernesto Laclau has also been influential, especially among political theorists 
with the likes of Chantal Mouffe, Francisco Panizza, Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos 
Katsambekis all working within his framework.33 If political scientists conceive the genus of 
populism to be an ideology and, thereby treat it as an ontic force, Laclau, and his allies, see 
it as a logic that constitutes the ontological fabric of the political.34 As Laclau puts it,  
 
the concept of populism that I am proposing is a strictly formal one, for all its defining 
features are exclusively related to a specific mode of articulation—the prevalence of 
the equivalential over the differential logic— independently of the actual contents 
that are being articulated . . . ‘populism’ is an ontological and not an ontic category.35  
 
This logic is triggered in the context of a crisis of representation in which a series of unmet 
‘demands’ are articulated together into what Laclau refers to as a counter-hegemonic ‘chain 
                                                     
30 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: 
Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 51:13 (2018), p. 1667-93. 
31 Interview with Cas Mudde on the root causes of populism at http://dialogue-on-
europe.eu/interview-cas-mudde-causes-populism-european-union/  
32 Cas Mudde, ‘The Problem with Populism’: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-
podemos-dark-side-europe.  
33 Francisco Panizza, (ed.) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London, Verso, 2005); 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London, Verso, 1985) 
and Mouffe, On the Political (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005); Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Populism in 
Power: Syriza's Challenge to Europe', Juncture, 21: 4 (2015), pp. 273-80; Yannis Stavrakakis 
and Giorgos Katsambekis, 'Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery', Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 19: 2 (2014), pp. 119-42. 
34 In other words, for Laclau treating populism as a sui generis form of radical politics ‘out 
there’ is to misconstrue its fundamental nature because all politics is marked by this binary 
discursive logic. It is the essential feature of the political. By contrast, for Mudde, and those 
who follow him, populism is a distinct type of radical politics that can be characterised in 
terms of specific, fixed features and that can be compared to other forms which are not 
populist.  
35 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populism: What's in a Name?’ in Francisco Panizza (ed.) Populism and the 
Mirror of Democracy, (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 32-49, p. 44. 
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of equivalence’. This temporary, precarious coalition is afforded a semblance of unity first 
by the production of ‘empty signifiers’ (i.e., the names of popular leaders or the ideals that 
they are aspiring to) that serve to gather and unite these hitherto disparate demands and 
second, by its opposition to a common enemy or established order.36 Thus, in a similar vein 
to the ideational approach, populism is understood as dyadic form of politics that has at its 
heart, a deep antagonism that cuts the social field into two irreconcilable camps. As Laclau 
states, ‘There is no populism without the discursive construction of an enemy: the ancient 
regime, the oligarchy, the Establishment or whatever’.37 
 
In terms of the subject of populism, as opposed to the Muddeian camp, for whom the 
emergence of populism presupposes an already existing constituency of people, for Laclau, 
it is only through and by means of discursive relations and the rhetorical devices mobilised 
by populist leaders, that ‘the people’ can be constituted as a popular subject in the first 
place.38 In other words, the ‘us’, along with their identity and interests, is brought into being 
through the ‘creative acts’ of a charismatic leader who inspires his followers to ‘affectively 
invest’ in his words and deeds.39 As a discursive strategy and mode of identification, 
populism becomes an active, potentially transformative social force. While this process of 
democratic reinvention is contingent, unpredictable and potentially hazardous – chains of 
equivalence can be articulated in defense of a politics for the left or the right - for Laclau it 
remains the blood of democratic life as institutionalised hegemony and populist counter-
hegemonies lock horns in the battle over and for ‘the people’.  
 
 
Populism as a radical politics?: A Feminist Rebuttal 
 
Before presenting my feminist critique of these two perspectives, it is important to 
note that each embody two very different modes of theorising and offer starkly contrasting 
evaluations of populism as a political force. So while the Muddean camp is committed to the 
construction of parsimonious definitions, hypothesis testing, and comparative empirical 
analyses, those in the Laclauian camp seek to defend and contribute to a highly abstract, 
formal theory of the political. For this reason, Muddeans tend to treat populism as an 
empirical phenomenon that can and must be mapped and measured; Laclauians, instead, 
prefer to draw on empirical case studies as illustrative examples of the applicability and/or 
normative relevance of their theorising.40 A second distinction worthy of mention, is that 
                                                     
36Laclau, ‘Populism: What's in a Name?’, p. 37. 
37 Laclau, ‘Populism: What's in a Name?’, p. 39. 
38 Ernesto Laclau, 'Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics', Critical 
Inquiry 32: 4 (2006), pp. 646-80. 
39 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London, Verso, 2005), p. 101. 
40 For examples of the former trend, see Agnes Akkerman, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove, 
‘How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters’,  Comparative 
Political Studies 47:9 (2013), pp.1324-1353; Matthijs Rooduijn and Teun Pauwels, 
‘Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis’, West European Politics 
34: 6 (2011), pp. 1272-1283; Kirk Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay and Cristóbal R. 
Kaltwasser, (eds.), The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2019), Chapters 1, 4, 5, 7. For examples of the latter, see Chantal Mouffe, 
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Muddeans have largely (but not exclusively) chosen to focus on and critically appraise 
radical right movements/parties as their exemplar of populism41 with Laclauians opting to 
explore and defend left-wing movements/parties (particularly in Latin America and 
Southern Europe) as the ‘genuine’ embodiment of populism.42 Of course, their contrasting 
political evaluations of populism, at least in part, reflect their empirical focus, a point I will 
return to later in the article. Finally, it should be acknowledged that in the heat of debate, 
both Mudde and Laclau have been interpreted in ways that may not always be faithful to 
the original intent of their work. For this reason, my critique will address both the 
ontological and conceptual baggage that I think necessarily comes along with these two 
narratives of populism (certainly made more explicit in the case of the Laclauian camp) as 
well as with the way in which they have been ‘taken up’ and adapted to make substantive 
claims about the nature and significance of populism.  
 
Despite these deep differences, both of these approaches to populism disappoint 
from a feminist theoretical perspective. For, as we shall see, with respect to the work of the 
ideational camp, the underlying story of emergence that feeds into this body of literature 
not only reifies and dichotomises politics in unhelpful ways, it also completely neglects the 
role of structural power relations. Adding to these limitations, I will also draw out the ways 
in which the ‘who’ of populism is personalised, individualized, and essentialised in a 
framework that ultimately de-politicises political agency. Running along similar lines, my 
critical interrogation of the Laclauian camp will first foreground its tendency to erase 
gender, race and class - both as a power relation and an embedded and embodied identity - 
from view and then go on to highlight how this post-Marxist notion of radical politics is 
freighted with an overly restrictive conception of subjectivity and misses crucial sites and 
enactments of politicisation. 
 
 
Populism as an ideology: the reification and personalisation of politics  
 
 
                                                     
For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018); Íñigo Errejón and Chantal Mouffe, Podemos: In 
the Name of the People (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2016), Ch. 10, 11, 12 and 13; 
Alexandros Kioupkiolis, ‘Podemos: the Ambiguous Promises of Left-wing Populism in 
Contemporary Spain’, Journal of Political Ideologies 21: 2 (2016), pp. 99-120; Yannis 
Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis, 'Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery', 
Journal of Political Ideologies, 19:2 (2014), pp. 119-42. 
41 One of Cas Mudde’s early works on populism was his book Populist Radical Right Parties in 
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). He continues to research radical right wing politics with his 
latest book The Far Right in America (London: Routledge 2017). 
42 Members of this camp have explicitly argued that populism, understood in Laclauian 
terms, can only meaningfully refer to left-wing movements, given that right-wing 
movements mobilise ‘the nation’, rather than ‘the people’, as its central empty signifier. For 
a defence of this position see Yannis Stavrakakis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianos, 
Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Thomas Siomos, ‘Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: 
Revisiting a Reified Association’, Critical Discourse Studies, 14: 4 (2017), pp. 420- 439. 
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As noted earlier, those in the ideational camp tend to locate the origins of populism, 
either explicitly or implicitly, in a framework that first separates out economic grievances 
from cultural ones and then extrapolates from each a discrete form of politics, that is, 
‘materialist’ politics’, on the one hand, and ‘identity’ politics, on the other. The most well-
known advocates of this thesis are Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart who claim that today 
we are witnessing a global ‘cultural backlash’ by predominantly older white men who fear 
that their identity is being undermined and their societal position devalued.43 As they put it, 
‘the orthogonal pull of cultural politics generates tensions and divisions within mainstream 
parties allowing new opportunities for populist leaders to mobilize electoral support’.44 
 
Despite very recent efforts to nuance the distinction between ‘economic anxiety’ and 
‘cultural backlash’ and their role in exacerbating populism,45 it remains a central, if implicit, 
reference point in this narrative.46 For instance, Mudde and Kaltwasser characterise 
European populism as a ‘post-material phenomenon, based first and foremost on identity’ 
while Latin American populism is depicted as an expression of ‘materialist politics’.47 Others 
have followed suit with Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel associating right-wing populist parties 
with strong ‘cultural’ positions (e.g., anti-immigration) and those on the left with 
‘socioeconomic’ ones.48 The upshot is that populism is parsed and reified into two distinct 
forms which, in turn, can be traced back to specific types of grievances.  
 
These explanations as to the causes of populism raise a number of feminist concerns. 
The first obvious concern relates to the rather easy and widespread reliance on the well-
worn binary between economic disadvantage vs. cultural stigmatisation. There is a long line 
of feminists who refuse the analytical utility and conceptual coherence of these kinds of 
                                                     
43 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and the Rise of 
Authoritarian Populism (New York: CUP, 2018); Norris and Inglehart, ‘The True Clash of 
Civilisations’, Foreign Policy, 135 (2003), pp. 62-70.  
44 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: the Economic 
Have Nots and Cultural Backlash’, (2016) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659 accessed July 12th 2019. 
45See Cas Mudde and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Studying Populism in Comparative 
Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda’, Comparative 
Political Studies, 51: 13 (2018), p. 1667-93.  
46 Michael Cox, ‘Understanding the Global Rise of Populism’ LSE!deas Blog (2018) at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/research/updates/populismhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/researc
h/updates/populism; Fareed Zakaria, ‘Populism on the March: Why the West is in Trouble’ 
Foreign Affairs, (2016) at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-
17/populism-march.  
47 Cas Mudde and Cristobal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: 
Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government and Opposition, 48: 2, 
(2013), pp. 147-174, 167.  
48 Steven Van Hauwaert and Stijn van Kessel, ‘Beyond Protest and Discontent: A Cross-
National Analysis of the Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party 
Support’, European Journal of Political Research, 57, (2018), pp. 68–92. 
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‘false antitheses’,49 arguing instead that feminists should challenge the ‘decoupling of 
cultural politics from social politics both politically and intellectually’.50 Separating out the 
cultural from the economic prevents us from grasping the ways in which these two realms 
are mutually constituted and reproduce identities that cut across both.  
 
A related and even more problematic issue, however, is the fact this narrative 
completely ignores the role of structural power relations in generating the grievances that 
allegedly lead to populist upsurges. So, for example, even when gender is explicitly 
addressed in the literature, it is treated as a measurable variable, reproduced and 
instantiated either by a country’s national culture or the state’s reigning ideology or both. 
Safely contained in these two ideational realms, Mudde and Kaltwasser conclude their 
article exploring the relationship between gender and populism with the claim that, at most, 
gender is secondary to the anti-elite struggle and that populism per se (minus the influence 
of its host ideology and the national culture in which it takes hold) appears gender neutral in 
both theory and practice.51 In a totalising politics of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ there is no space or 
incentive to inquire into the internal conflicts or hierarchies that shape each camp or the 
way that gender might impact on the lives of women and men in material ways as lived 
experience. 
 
Moving from the ‘why’ to the ‘who’ of populism, the ideational camp rely on highly 
individualized, essentialised, and gendered portrayals of its main protagonists. So, although 
a charismatic leader is not a requirement according to Mudde’s definition of populism,52 
much of this literature assumes the presence of one, with his or her speeches and ‘political 
style’ constituting key components of the empirical subject matter to be studied.53 While 
                                                     
49 Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-
Socialist” Age’, New Left Review, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93; Iris Marion Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Patricia Hill Collins, 
Black Feminist Thought (New York: Routledge, 2000); Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, 
‘Theorising Feminist Organising in and against Neoliberalism: Beyond Co-optation and 
Resistance?’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, 1: 1-2 (2018), pp. 223-239. 
50 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Post-Socialist Condition (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), p. 5. 
51 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Vox Populi or Vox Masculine? Populism and 
Gender in Northern Europe and South America’, Patterns of Prejudice, 49: 1-2 (2015), pp. 
16-36, 35.  
52 See Mudde and Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing 
Contemporary Europe and Latin America’, p. 154. 
53 For a discussion of leadership in the context of the theory and practice of populism see 
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism and Political Leadership’ in R. A. W. 
Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); see also Roger Eatwell, ‘Charisma and the Radical Right’ in Jens 
Rydgren (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018) or Benjamin Moffitt (2016) who argues that the leader should be the focus of 
any study of populism because it is the leader who ultimately ‘does’ or ‘performs’ populism, 
p. 52. 
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there are variations in the story, it is on this aspect of populism that we find the most 
obviously gendered script. Whether he is presented as a rational, instrumental ‘action man’ 
or a messianic like figure, populism is usually depicted as a politics that is ushered into being 
by a swaggering figurehead full of bravado, bluster, and self-belief. Capturing the single 
mindedness and strategically driven nature of populist leaders, Moffitt, tells us that, 
‘Populists do not display ambivalence towards democracy as much as opportunism: they are 
usually quite clear and passionate about the kind of democracy they favour – the kind that 
will allow them to get in power or, if they are already in power, allow them to stay in 
power’.54 For others, the leader is construed as Manichean in nature, animated solely by the 
moral certainty of their quest.55 Either way, populism is conceived of as a radical politics that 
is driven forward by a one dimensional man (or woman) whose success is dependent on a 
highly gendered performance of leadership.56  
 
While feminist notions of leadership may be varied, the idea of a ‘strongman’, whatever 
gender, poses a problem with its attendant hyper masculinist imagery and inherent 
assumptions about what constitutes strength, coherence, competence and good decision-
making. This is not to say that feminists do not recognise the gendered nature of social 
activism, in general, and of movement leadership, in particular. Over the last decade, 
feminists have produced reams of work deconstructing the various modes of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ that emerge within social movements and foregrounding and conceptualising 
the gendered and racialised nature of political performances more generally.57 As 
Montesinos Coleman and Bassi suggest,  
 
Certain patterns of masculinity in particular tend to attain hegemonic status as 
normalized and authoritative forms of conduct, shoring up the power and advantage of 
elite males and (hetero)patriarchal order more generally.58 
 
In terms of populism more specifically, Caravantes has highlighted the ‘homosocial’ political 
culture of Podemos59 while Kantola and Lombardo argue that what populism in Finland and 
Spain share is that they both represent ‘a political praxis that is imbued with hegemonic 
                                                     
54 Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism, p. 150. 
55 Jans-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Penguin Random House, 2016) emphasis added, 
p. 39. 
56 It is important to remember that this gendered description of leadership does not 
constitute an empirical finding, i.e., it is not the result of inductive, comparative sociological-
ethnographic research, but is rather built into the framing of what constitutes charismatic 
leadership in the context of populism.  
57 Lara Montesinos Coleman and Serena Bassi, ‘Deconstructing Militant Manhood’, 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13: 2 (2011), pp. 204-224; Shirin Rai, ‘Political 
Performance: A Framework for Analysing Democratic Politics’, Political Studies, 63: 5 (2014) 
1179-1197; Nirmal Puwar, Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place (Oxford: 
Berg Publishers, 2004).  
58 Montesinos Coleman and Bassi, ‘Deconstructing Militant Manhood’, p. 207.  
59 Paloma Caravantes, ‘New Vs Old Politics in Podemos’. 
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masculinity and confrontation’.60 In this way, feminist critiques of populism, as a mode of 
politics, confirm the need to be attentive to the role that gendered political performances 
can play within all forms of radical politics, populism included. Importantly, however, 
feminists have also argued for some time now that we need to rethink and re-describe what 
we mean by leadership.61 To this end, they have argued for a range of alternative 
conceptions that understand this practice as a means, rather than an end, and as a non-
individualistic, participatory and dialogical collective process which necessarily requires 
analysts to move beyond a narrow focus on the words and deeds of individual men or 
women.62 In this way, they reject the ideal-typical (masculine) conception of leadership that 
the literature on populism buys into and reproduces as the norm. In other words, feminist 
scholarship encourages us to not only challenge the gendered ways in which we study 
leadership, but also to question the gendered implications of conceptualising politics in 
terms of leaders and leadership in the first place.63  
 
Turning to the populist voter, we find an equally problematic narrative which presents 
this subject as one marked by ‘biased beliefs’,64  ‘latent populist attitudes’,65 and stable 
preferences (e.g. ‘nativism’,  ‘close mindedness’), all seen as rooted in their psychological 
disposition. Substantively, populist revolts are often equated with ‘white working class 
men’66 or ‘the left behinds’ and their collective refusal to accept cultural and socio-economic 
                                                     
60 Kantola and Lombardo, ‘Populism and Feminist Politics: The Case of Spain and Finland’, p. 
18.  
61 For an excellent, comprehensive overview of this effort see Laura Sjoberg, ‘Feminism’ in R. 
A. W. Rhodes and Paul 't Hart (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) available at https://0-www-oxfordhandbooks-
com.lib.exeter.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653881.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199653881-e-004  
62 Jill Blackmore, ‘Disrupting Notions of Leadership from Feminist Postcolonial Positions’, 
International Journal of Leadership in Education: Theory and Practice 13:1 (2010), p. 1–6; 
Amanda Sinclair, Leadership for the Disillusioned: Moving beyond Myths and Heroes to 
Leading that Liberates (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2007); Srilatha Batliwala, ‘Feminist 
Leadership for Social Transformation: Clearing the Conceptual Cloud’ (2010) available at 
https://justassociates.org/sites/justassociates.org/files/feminist-leadership-clearing-
conceptual-cloud-srilatha-batliwala.pdf.  
63 Sjoberg, ‘Feminism’. 
64 Takis Pappas, ‘Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist 
Hungary’, Government and Opposition, 49: 1 (2014) pp. 1-23, 8. 
65 Van Hauwaert and van Kessel , ‘Beyond Protest and Discontent: A Cross-National Analysis 
of the Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party Support’, p. 70.  
66 Aurélien Mondon and Aaron Winter, ‘Whiteness, Populism and the Racialisation of the 
Working Class in the United Kingdom and the United States’, Identities: Global Studies in 
Culture and Power, (2018) available at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440; Also see Akwugo 
Emejulu, ‘Can the people be feminists? Analysing the fate of feminist justice claims in 
populist grassroots movements in the United States’, Interface: a journal for and about 
social movements, 3:2 (2011), pp 123-151.  
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change.67 As mentioned earlier, populist voters are often assumed to be motivated by a 
cultural anxiety which stems from a fear that their identity and status are under threat.68 
Moreover, we are told that they are a ‘small c’ conservative lot to the extent that, unlike 
other ‘protest prone’ groups, they are marked by ‘their reactiveness: they generally have to 
be mobilised by a populist actor, rather than taking the initiative themselves’.69 In this way, 
the populist voter is constituted as close-minded, male and passive, albeit politically 
menacing when feeling threatened.  
 
There are several difficulties with this discourse. First, it reifies racial and cultural 
identities as explanatory variables in fostering populism and, in so doing, serves to displace 
the role that structural inequalities play, including the loss of relative privilege that some 
groups have experienced in recent years, in exacerbating our sense of grievance. Moreover, 
this narrative not only ‘whitewashes’ the working class, it also judges them as culpable for 
the rise of populism (at least of the right-wing variety).70 As we well know, both Trump’s 
victory and Brexit were presented as the unfortunate outcome of a resentful, working class 
politics by media commentators and academics alike in both countries. The fact that these 
working class folk include women as well as people of all colours, ethnicities and religions is 
not problematised in this literature nor can it be accounted for in this dyadic politics of ‘us’ 
vs ‘them’.71 This is, in part, because without homogenising the people it would be 
impossible to imagine how the volonté générale – central to Mudde’s definition, but 
completely under-theorised in the literature - is to be identified and acted upon. In this 
narrative we move in one unexplained step from atomised, annoyed citizens and their 
alleged individualized preferences to a unified, self-conscious movement acting in its own 
singular interest. How this movement is held together and what gives it energy and 
direction remains a mystery.  
 
 
Populism as a Logic: the abstraction and de-radicalisation of radical politics 
  
Although Laclau’s work is an explicit effort to re-politicise liberal democratic politics and 
to defend the idea that a radical politics can emerge from ‘popular subjects’ that are not 
                                                     
67 Aurélien Mondon, ‘Limiting Democratic Horizons to a Nationalist Reaction: Populism, the 
Radical Right and the Working Class’, Journal of the European Institute for Communication 
and Culture, 24:4 (2017), pp. 355-374. 
68 See, for example, Fareed Zakaria ‘Populism on the March: Why the West is in Trouble’, 
Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2016), pp. 13-15, or for a variation of this view, see Christopher 
Parker, Sebastian Mayer, Nicole Buckley, ‘Left, Right, But No In-between: Explaining 
American Polarisation and Post-factualism under President Trump’ in Lise Herman and 
James Muldoon (eds.), Trumping the Mainstream (Routledge: New York, 2019), pp. 112-30. 
69 Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', Government and Opposition, 39: 4 (2005), p. 548. 
70 For an interesting discussion of the construction of the ‘white working class’, primarily in 
the US context, see ‘Whitewashing the Working Class’ at American Sociological Review 
available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1536504217714256  
71 For a critical deconstruction of the implicit racist implications of this narrative see 
Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Brexit, Trump and “methodological whiteness”: on the 
misrecognition of race and class’, British Journal of Sociology 68: 1 (2017), pp. 214-232. 
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reducible to class, his account is curiously even more devoid of any serious engagement 
with power, and its workings, than that of the ideational camp.  Gender, race and class are 
invisible in this story, at least at the theoretical level, both as an oppressive power relation, 
against which people resist, and as an entrenched identity that shapes how we perceive our 
friends and enemies and engage politically in the world.  
 
As stated earlier, for Laclau populism emerges in the context of a ‘crisis of 
representation’ in which the legitimacy of the governing authority is put into doubt due to 
its failure to meet a series of demands. In this context, society is presented as a de-centred, 
non-deterministic, open discursive field in which any and all demands can be politicised – 
whether they are or not depends on the articulatory skills of a leader and whether ‘the 
people’ come to ‘invest’ in their efforts.  
 
This picture raises a number of questions from a feminist point of view. The first is that 
radical politics is translated into a politics of demands which, in turn, find their origins in 
individualized grievances (which only later may become aggregated into chains of 
equivalence). What cannot be accounted for here is the way in which these demands, and 
their attendant grievances, are a response to perceived injustices and recalcitrant power 
relations that are enacted by, but go beyond the state’s reach and mandate. In other words, 
it is difficult to see how one might explore the role that class, gender or race play in 
determining which demands gain traction and which do not. Certainly, the flux and flow of 
‘empty’ or ‘floating’ signifiers cannot capture, let alone shift, these kinds of embedded 
practices and the ways they set the conditions of possibility for the articulation and taking 
up of specific demands.  
 
This brings us to another closely related difficulty which concerns the latent voluntarism 
that underpins its politics. In the end, all subjects of a democracy are seen to be the same to 
the extent that they are all free to enter the political fray on equal terms. Celebrating this 
‘lightness of being’, Katsambekis and Stavrakakis opine:  
 
Unlike the people of the extreme right, the people of the left is usually a plural, future 
oriented, inclusionary and active subject unbound by ethnic, racial, sexual, gender or 
other restrictions; a subject envisaged as acting on initiative and directly intervening in 
common matters, a subject that does not wait to be led or saved by anyone’ (emphasis 
added).72  
 
From this angle, it is impossible to see how some of us are marked by identities – often 
imposed on us by others – that do bind us and, at best, are very hard to re-articulate. For 
instance, as Benjamin McKean explains, Laclau’s ‘populist reason’ is unable to accommodate 
the non-contingent role of ‘racial resentment’ in determining the modes of identification in 
                                                     
72 It is important to remember, as pointed out in note 41, that for these authors only left 
politics can be construed as really populist since right wing movements construct 
themselves in the name of the ‘nation’ and not ‘the people’.  
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which we invest.73 In other words, Laclau’s discursive field is far more ‘socially uneven’ and 
less open than he or his acolytes appear to recognise.  
 
If Laclau’s vision of populism is premised on an attenuated conception of power, it 
also withholds from us any conceptual tools to make sense of how and why we build 
relations of solidarity. Inspired by a Lacanian notion of subjectivity, we are told that 
individual identity as well as a sense of collective unity is achieved only in the face of 
difference, that is, a frontier beyond which exists an ‘Other’, that which I am not.74 In this 
context, populism can only be an act of refusal, a mass politics of antagonism which serves 
to consolidate our own identity. As many feminists would point out, forging a radical 
politics, intent on transforming the world, requires a more complicated picture than this. As 
highlighted in the introduction, one needs an account of subjectivity and sociality that 
allows us to trace the social processes that foster group formation and serve to sustain 
collective agency in the face of the enemy. A theory of social identity premised on ‘lack’ and 
the yearning for ‘completeness’, abstracted from our embodied experiences and committed 
to opposing equivalence to difference is simply not adequate to this task.75 As feminist 
philosopher Linda Alcoff explains it, identities must be understood as much more than the 
political effects of struggle and by prioritising a view ‘from the outside in… and never from 
the inside out’, Laclau and Mouffe miss ‘essential features … that play an important role in 
the formulation of political positions and judgements’.76 One of these essential features is 
the role played by our utopian aspirations. For nothing in this theory helps us to think about 
what populism, as a collective endeavor, is fighting for beyond a precarious concatenation 
of multiple demands that increasingly loses its substantive meaning the more inclusive 
(stretched) the equivalential chain becomes. Capturing this critique of Laclau’s notion of 
populism, Kingsbury states,  
 
‘As a democratic strategy or logic, … populism feeds on and reproduces a content-
less approach to politics that valorizes electoral success over other principles and 
ideas’.77  
 
The problem is that feminist conceptions of radical politics, in all their variety, encourage 
us to pay attention to this future oriented, normative dimension of agency because it is 
crucial to understanding why movements emerge in the first place, how they enact their 
politics and their potential impact.  So while this normative feature of feminist politics has 
                                                     
73 Benjamin McKean, ‘Towards an Inclusive Populism? On the Role of Race and Difference in 
Laclau’s Politics’, Political Theory, 44: 6 (2016), pp. 797-820. 
74 Aletta Norval, ‘Frontiers in Question’, Filozofski Vestnik 18:2 (1997), pp. 51-75. 
75 Nancy Fraser, ‘Structuralism or Pragmatics? On Discourse Theory and Feminist Politics’, 
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https://www.academia.edu/12176446/Populism_as_Post-
Politics_Ernesto_Laclau_Hegemony_and_the_Limits_of_Democracy 
18 
 
been formulated and defended in a range of diverse ways from a ‘feminist ethos’78 to a 
‘feminist utopian imagination’79 and from an ‘ethics of care’80 to ‘prefigurative’ politics,81 
what these efforts share is a conviction that the wished for ends of a struggle should shape 
the means. 
 
And here we come to the rub because, in the end, the nature of the transformation 
envisioned by Laclau and enacted by ‘populist reason’ is simply incompatible with these 
feminist visions of justice. For while populism is ultimately about securing, widening and 
radicalising democracy (read pluralising it); for feminists the struggle must move beyond 
calls for participation, representation and the recognition of demands, important though 
they are, and encompass the quest to both overturn intractable relations of 
subordination/marginalisation and to build a world of social justice, in general, and ‘gender 
justice’ in particular.82 In pursuing this emancipatory vision, feminists would have to reject 
the binary logic of populism, that necessarily opposes equivalence to difference, and instead 
seek to defend simultaneously both a struggle for equality (universality) and a struggle for 
difference (particularity). In other words, unlike populism, feminism does not yearn for ‘an 
impossible totality that unifies and homogenizes discrete demands’83 preferring, like many 
other social movements striving for social justice, to build a world where unity can be built 
out of, through and alongside difference. As McKean summarises,  
 
‘a more inclusive populism will only be possible when difference and equality can be 
thought together and “the people” can be represented without rendering them 
homogenous’.84  
 
Finally, a feminist critique of populism would not be complete without pointing out that 
the form of politics invoked by Laclau’s notion does not chime well with the complex 
practices, diverse spaces and different temporalities of feminist activism. In contrast to the 
unified ‘blocs’ and phalanx formations that come to mind when reading Laclau’s work and 
to the high speed discursive fluctuations that determine the battle lines, feminist practice 
presents us with a far more slow-burning, process oriented and multivalent mode of doing 
politics that cuts across the public/private divide. So while all the work done by advocates of 
this approach locate populism in the public sphere and take the state as its main 
                                                     
78 See Sasha Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Political Action at Greenham 
Common (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995) and Catherine Eschle and Bice 
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79 Erin McKenna, The Task of Utopia. 
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interlocutor, feminist social movement scholars have long known that tracing the practices 
of radical politics, feminist or otherwise, requires much larger, more intricate maps which 
include communities and homes as politicised spaces and which decentres the state, aware 
of the complex, ambivalent relationship that many movements, including feminism, have 
with it.85 Capturing the temporality of feminism militates against an exclusive focus on 
dramatic disjunctures and heroic acts of unification; requiring us instead to be attentive to 
the incremental, cumulative processes of self-transformation and collective consciousness 
raising that take place in the realm of everyday practices and that can lead, under certain 
conditions, to other ways of being in the world and doing politics.  
  
 
Tracing Populism as a Political Signifier and its Feminist Discontents 
 
‘The charge of populism tells us at least as much about those making the charge as it 
does about their opponents, and in contemporary political contexts the inherent 
ambiguity of populism assumes clear polemical meaning when articulated from the 
embattled position of a once-hegemonic liberalism’.86 
 
In this second part of the article, I want to shift into a different mode of analysis which 
leaves theoretical critique behind and moves toward a critical reflection of the political 
consequences of elevating ‘populism’, as the trope du jour, to capture our contemporary 
political landscape. In other words, I want to explore the performative effects of this new 
political signifier on our political discourses, in general, and on the future fortunes of 
feminism, in particular. In doing so, I follow the intuitions of Glynos and Mondon when they 
suggest that the recent ‘populist turn’ represents not just an analytical move, but also a 
politicised one which serves to pre-empt and contain any line of critical questioning about 
the way liberal democracy works today and the possible alternatives to it.87 What I cannot 
do here is engage with two small, but growing, bodies of literature, one that seeks to raise 
doubts about the analytical acuity of populism, as an operationalisable concept,88 and the 
other about the dangers and opportunities that arise when movements self-consciously 
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adopt populism as an identity and modus vivendi.89 While sympathetic to the former strand 
of literature and interested in the latter, here I simply focus on the way the term is being 
mobilised by its liberal critics, whether accurately or not, and the implications of this 
deployment for the visibility and well-being of feminism, as one crucial instantiation of left 
politics.  
 
The first, more obvious, performative effect of populism, as a political signifier, is the 
straightforward disciplinary power that labelling a particular instantiation of politics as 
populist has on our normative and intellectual assessment of it.90 In this current climate, to 
characterise a politics as populist is equivalent to identifying it as potentially illiberal and 
dangerous. Or, as Frank puts it, ‘the blanket accusation of populism polices the boundaries 
of ‘politics as usual’ and the parameters of legitimate and reasonable political speech’.91 The 
case of ‘Corbynism’ in the UK, often belittled in media and academic circles in Britain as a 
form of ‘left wing populism’ is illustrative. The politics sustaining Corbyn’s Labour Party 
cannot be meaningfully characterised as populist if either of the definitions that have been 
explored in this article are used as a benchmark. While I have defended this position 
elsewhere92, what needs to be underlined here is that most of those who describe the 
Labour Party as currently pandering to a populist politics are seeking to dismiss or denigrate 
this latest upsurge of left-wing activism.  
 
What should concern us as feminists, in this case, is not whether the label fits or not, 
but rather the fact that a new left politics, embracing a confluence of nascent strands of 
feminist, queer and anti-racist activism, is being so quickly set aside as beyond the pale.   
Such slow burning processes of progressive transformation, even if halting, are worth 
studying and possibly nurturing. Lambasting Corbynism as populist, tout court, as many 
commentators do, simply discourages this kind of nuanced, patient inquiry and bundles 
together in one homogenous blob a complex, hybrid entanglement of various strands of left 
activism, of which feminism plays an important part. 93 Similarly, both Podemos and Syriza 
have generated interesting and, in the case of Spain, powerful feminist forms of 
contestation. The fact that both continue to be shaped by masculine modes of political 
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performance should not take away from these feminist efforts and simply labeling these 
parties as ‘populist’ makes us less inclined to look for them.94  
 
In addition to giving scholars and pundits the means of writing off certain forms of 
radical politics in which feminist are alive and well, albeit struggling for visibility and 
support, feminists will have to face up to a second challenge. With the ascendancy of 
‘populism’ have come renewed appeals to jettison the seemingly anachronistic left-right 
distinction, political categories that, according to their detractors, reflect a naive nostalgia 
for the past. Populism, it now seems, trumps what Steven Lukes has called ‘the grand 
dichotomy of the 20th century’.95  There are three rationalities that play into this demand. 
The first of these is that in these troubled times we must rethink and re-frame the sources 
of conflict and cleavage in our globalised world. So while the Economist talks of a struggle 
between ‘open societies’ and ‘closed ones’ and David Goodhart, a British journalist, insists 
that the new political frontier is really between the ‘people from somewhere’ and the 
‘people from anywhere’,96 Tony Blair prefers to fight populism by addressing the tensions 
created between ‘globalisations losers’ vs its ‘winners’.97  The fact that right-wing forces also 
endorse jettisoning the language of the left and right in favour of similar distinctions, such 
as that between ‘globalists’ and ‘patriots’, as Marie Le Pen puts it, does not seem to yet 
worry the liberal exponents of these newly fashioned binaries.98  
 
A second narrative that implicitly sustains the claim that the left-right distinction is 
now past its ‘sell by date’ is the view that the defining feature of populist movements is its 
populism, rather than the contents of its ‘host’ ideology.  So academics such as John Judis, 
for instance, argue that left wing populism is only different from right wing populism to the 
extent that it does not attack ‘out groups’99 and Rooduijn and Akkerman suggest that the 
left and right ‘do not differ significantly from each other when it comes to their populism’.100  
In this context, while it is accepted that left wing populism can be inclusionary and more 
often oriented to ‘hope’ rather than ‘fear’,101 it is nonetheless seen as a deviation from and 
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a challenge to liberal representative government and, therefore, like right-wing populisms, 
as a potential threat to democracy.  
 
This brings us to the last rationality that feeds into this dismantling of the left-right 
divide: the view that tackling populism requires the re-energising and re-legitimising of the 
‘centre ground’ of politics.102 In this way, the fundamental cleavage of our globalised world 
becomes that between populism (right or left matters little) and anti-populism understood 
as the forces of ‘moderation’ or what Nancy Fraser has recently called ‘progressive 
neoliberalism’.103 In this clash, it is the right that has been elevated as the formidable 
bogeyman of the day,104 with the left sidelined as a spent, ineffectual force. In this way, 
populism as a signifer actively serves to diminish the grip of left politics, trivialising its 
efforts, and when it does garner some public support, as in the case of Corbynism in Britain 
or Syriza in Greece, then demonising it.  
 
Whatever the reason, this pull to the centre has serious consequences for feminism, 
understood as a project committed to the realisation of one historically significant strand of 
left politics. After all, any effort to dismantle the normative and conceptual edifice 
sustaining a left, egalitarian vision of social justice poses a direct threat to theory and 
practice of feminism both in its current instantiations and as a collective utopian aspiration. 
While feminism has always had to struggle to find space within socialist/anarchist circles, it 
now faces yet another hostile frontier conjured up and reinforced by both the right and the 
liberal centre ground. To make matters worse, some on ‘the left’ have responded to this 
changing political terrain by closing ranks and blaming what they see as ‘identity politics’ 
(read feminism, queer politics and movements like Black Lives Matter) for dividing and 
weakening the movement.105 Clearly then, anti-populist discourses are now set to pose as 
much of a threat to feminism as populist ones. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I want to end this article with some reflections on what lessons might be drawn from the 
extant debate around populism in terms of the current state of theorising in the field, the 
position of feminist scholarship in this context, and, last but not least, the role of politicised 
scholarship in academia.   
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On the question of theorising, what is quite striking about the meteoric rise of 
populism as a concept, and the now booming literature surrounding it, is the frantic haste 
with which scholars have clambered after universal and empirically operationalisable, (read 
minimalist) definitions of this putative phenomenon. This has been accompanied by equally 
urgent efforts to apply them to as wide a number of cases as possible and, thereby, pin 
down the impact and future trajectory of this new political force. One casualty of this mad 
rush to corner the field has been the act of careful, informed, reflexive theorising, one in 
which both deductive and inductive thinking are encouraged and which is open to revision. 
As a result, the debates and exchanges between these two opposing theoretical camps, 
although commendably generous and constructive in tone, are often marked by a mindless 
eclecticism that belie any understanding of their very real conceptual differences. While 
advocates of the ideational camp regularly reference the work of discourse theorists, as if 
they are all broadly part of the same project106 - undisturbed by the fact that the ‘ideational’ 
definition cannot accommodate Laclau’s position – acolytes of Laclau return the favour by 
either adopting and/or defending Mudde’s definition of populism against other more 
explicitly polemical depictions of it.107 This rather muddled approach to theory and its 
application has even been noticed by Mudde and Kaltwasser themselves who have recently 
made a polite plea for populism scholars to read and engage with each other’s work more 
diligently.108 In sum, populism, as a concept, has been ushered into academic circles on a 
wave of positivism and an exclusive commitment to streamlined definitions and impactful, 
empirical and policy related research.109 ‘Thicker’, historically and sociologically inflected, 
inductive forms of theorising, of the kind that feminists have argued for, do not seem to be 
part of the agenda. 
 
Given this theoretical state of affairs, it is unsurprising that feminists have been 
relatively slow to jump on the bandwagon. Matters may not be helped by the fact that the 
field, at least at the moment, is rather male dominated,110 possibly a function of its hitherto 
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fascination with mapping the prowess and antics of far right male leaders and the 
quantification and de-coding of their speeches. Feminists have not been entirely immune to 
the ‘populist hype’, however, and, as already mentioned, there is an incipient strand of 
feminist scholarship on the subject seeking to condemn its gendered political practices. But 
are we conceding too quickly to our colleagues by accepting, wholesale, their definitions, 
along with all their problematic conceptual baggage? And if so, what further theoretical and 
empirical research needs to be done to render populism a meaningful term, one which 
captures a form of popular insurgency worthy of study and that can speak to existing 
feminist insights into the origins and workings of radical politics more generally?  Of course, 
as we move forward in our efforts to navigate this perplexing political and intellectual 
terrain, we will have to remember that, despite producing swathes of rich theoretical and 
empirical scholarship on every aspect of ‘the political’, radical and otherwise, over the last 
several decades, feminist scholarship remains ghettoised. For one depressing lesson drawn 
from this review of populism studies is that it appears to be immune to any feminist 
knowledge. To put it differently, after all these years, we are still talking to ourselves, even if 
our own feminist circles have become wider and more cross disciplinary than ever.  
 
Finally, if the conceptual challenge posed by populism is not enough, feminists also need 
to be alert to the politicised nature of this debate. For despite generalised calls to drop the 
left–right distinction, populism scholars continue to happily instantiate it through their 
debates about the good and bad of populism. After all, the majority of Laclauians openly 
celebrate the emancipatory potential of left-wing populism to liberate us from ‘the 
extremism of moderation’111, while many within the ideational camp choose to rally behind 
this moderate liberalism. Clearly, these different normative assessments reflect not just 
theoretical/methodological disagreements, but also political ones. While feminists have 
always acknowledged the politicised nature of knowledge production, including our own, 
this is not widely accepted in academia, where objective science remains the order of the 
day. Drawing attention to these tacit political commitments and debating them openly and 
honestly will not only deepen our analysis of the intended and unintended effects of radical 
politics, but may also encourage a degree of humility when we issue our pronouncements 
and predictions, knowing that are views are contestable and situated.  
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IR has yet to experience ‘populism fever’ and can afford to approach the subject with 
both curiosity and caution. There is no doubt that the radical insurgencies that are bubbling 
forth today provide potentially rich case studies for those of us interested in understanding 
and theorising the politics of collective action in the name of a radically transformed world. 
As we start our inquiries, however, we need to recognise that our current analytical tool box 
is far from complete and that fortifying it requires us to be open to longstanding feminist 
insights into the origins and nature of radical politics.  
 
 
